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ABRAHAM LINCOLN CONCEIVED ours as "government of the
people, by the people, for the people,"' when he coined the epigram
now emblematic of the best aspirations of American democracy. Two
legs of Lincoln's triad have received a good deal of scholarly and popular attention. Twentieth-century constitutional theory produced
much work addressed, at least implicitly, to what it means to be a government "of' the people and "by" the people. The idea of government
"of' the people underlies scholarship addressing the accountability
of
government actors, the expansion of the franchise, and the promotion of public deliberation. This work recognizes a need for the people to have some meaningful ownership of their government. Even
more voluminous is the literature devoted to the idea of government
"by" the people, including theories of participation, majoritarianism,
representation, civic republicanism, public choice, and even campaign finance. All of these areas of inquiry touch to some degree on
what it means for the people to be the instrument of their own
government.
Christopher L. Eisgruber's bold new book, ConstitutionalSelf-Government,2 falls among a much smaller group making a serious effort to
explore what it would mean for a government to be "for" the people
as well. The book, couched in terms that cast their focus primarily on
judges, is, at its core, about a matter much deeper than judicial review,
and fundamental to a democracy. The book forces the reader to consider what it actually means for the people as a whole to govern themselves. Fundamental as it is, this central question has been largely
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank my colleagues
Allison Danner, John Goldberg, and Bob Rasmussen for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this essay.
1. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
2. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
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skirted or even ignored by many constitutional theorists. Eisgruber,
however, reaches beyond the simple platitudes, like "majority rule" or
'judges should not make law," which cling to our public debate like so
many barnacles-hard to remove, sharp-edged, and contributing little-and suggests an answer arising from a new way to understand the
institution of judicial review.
Not since John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust3 has a book on
constitutional theory sought so valiantly to situate judicial review organically within a robust and thriving vision of democracy. Eisgruber's
book shares some similarities with that earlier icon of constitutional
theory. Physically, the books bear a family resemblance: same press,
same size, same format, nearly the same length. They both have just
six chapters, the first of which is devoted to demonstrating the bankruptcy of the originalist perspective on the Constitution, and describing the impoverished understanding of the role of the courts in
American democracy to which it invariably leads. Both move on from
there to a more affirmative explication of the role of courts in a democracy. Both books are written fluidly and straightforwardly, using
refreshingly simple prose.
But there are important differences, as well. 4 Ely's goal was to "fill
in" the Constitution's open texture and offer judges a relatively simple
way to resolve a whole range of constitutional claims. Eisgruber, in
contrast, believes (in true democratic spirit) that the Constitution's
open texture cannot be filled in with any systematic approach that
aspires to offer prescriptive solutions. If the Constitution is to be the
dynamic facilitator of self-government that Eisgruber envisions, then
only individual judgments about specific situations can serve to resolve the many issues that arise under the document's more abstract
provisions. And therein lies the real difference between Ely and Eisgruber: Ely's is a parsimonious model of judicial review that limits the
courts to a role of policing the representative process, betraying an
underlying discomfort with the institution of judging and, accordingly, seeking to defend judicial review only as a means to lubricate
the machinery of a government largely by the people. Eisgruber, on
the other hand, celebrates the judgment vested by the Constitution in
the courts as a salutary element of American democracy, allowing the
3.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
4. Indeed, Eisgruber goes so far as to point out their difference, suggesting by his
disavowal, perhaps, that he may sense the tempting comparison. See EISGRUBER, supra note
2, at 5-6.
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judiciary an instrumental role in ensuring a government for the
people.
If one reads this book quickly or uncharitably, one might come
away with a general sense that the author simply defends judicial review and places the task of interpreting important moral issues in the
courts. This does not sound new, nor does it seem to carry much to
persuade anyone who did not start out already sympathetic to judicial
review. To such a critic, perhaps, confronted with another defense of
judicial review, they all "look alike." 5 If this conclusion is all one takes
away from the book, however, one has missed a great deal of what it
has to offer. There is much that is new, much that is persuasive, and
much that should give pause to anyone, sympathetic to judicial review
or not, who has yet to grapple with the fundamental questions of democratic theory that Eisgruber poses. Because I fear that these significant contributions are easy to miss, I seek in this responsive essay to
highlight what I see as the important impact of Eisgruber's theory.
In the end, the tenacious reader is rewarded, for Eisgruber offers
us a radically new answer to Bickel 6-an answer that deserves thoughtful attention. His answer urges us to understand judicial review not as
"deviant" from the standpoint of democracy, but indeed as consistent,
perhaps even necessary, to achieve democracy in its fullest sense of
government of, by, and for all the people.
This essay proceeds in two parts. The first half presents my understanding of the major steps in Eisgruber's argument. In the effort to
summarize a complex argument briefly, clearly and faithfully, I aspire
to sketch a portrait of this rich book rather than a photograph, and
inevitably I will fail to be entirely faithful to the author's own enterprise. But I hope Professor Eisgruber will find that the representation
captures something of its spirit. The second half of this essay will be
devoted to discussing both the most troubling aspect of Eisgruber's
account, in my view, and its most valuable contribution to a better
polity. Both center around his pervasive reliance on the concept of
moral judgment.

5. Hence, perhaps, the relentless clumping of Eisgruber's theory with Dworkin's in
Professor Hills's critique in this symposium, despite the important differences between the
two. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Are Judges Really More Principled than Voters?, 37 U.S.F. L. REv.
37, 38, 45, 50, 51, 53, 57-59 (2002).
6. See ALEXANDER M. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that the "root difficulty" is that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American
democracy).
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The Problem

The colossal theoretical problem posed by the very popular
majoritarian approach to government-every school child senses the
facial fairness of a "majority rule" system-is most often not acknowledged by the champions of majoritarianism. Yet the problem persists:
Should 51% of the population be able to deal 100% of societal benefits to themselves 100% of the time, and impose 100% of the costs,
preferences and moral values on the other 49%? And if not, why not?
Even the school child with the innate sense of fairness also perceives
that it is a small step from "majority rule" to "ganging up."
Those who can accept the majoritarian model indulge in a cognitive dissonance that allows them to believe that this is not a problem
for democracy, but rather a necessary consequence of it. When "the
people" speak through their (ostensibly) majoritarian institutions,
those who suffer the burdens of that process have no grounds to complain. The hope is that shifting coalitions will ensure that individuals
will not always be on the losing side. This may not be perfectly fair, but
it is the only way democracies can resolve issues of public policy, they
say. These defenders look to avenues of public discussion and debate,
as well as opportunities for participation through free elections, as evidence that democracy-focusing on free access to its processes-is
flourishing. But Eisgruber shows this to be a shallow conception of
democracy, barely masking the ugly truth that controversial issues will
have to be resolved somehow, and no amount of discourse or participation will alleviate the pain of losing such a policy dispute.
Some will take solace in the Constitution's protections against
breakdowns in majoritarian decision-making, and indeed the idea of
having a constitution is often defended on just such grounds. John
Hart Ely thought there might be identifiable markers of a relatively
rare situation in which majoritarian institutions misuse the power accorded to them by a majority-rule system, and that courts could be
taught to watch for those markers and intervene to invalidate any resulting legislation. This approach would preserve majority rule, but
only in the sense that all could participate. 7 It would prevent the majority from silencing and disenfranchising the minority, but offers the
minority no further consolation. Notice the implicit emphasis on participation-government by the people.
7. The indicia tend to focus on group characteristics of a burdened class that has
suffered a history of prejudice, political powerlessness, and other forms of vulnerability to
overt discrimination. See ELY, supra note 3, at 75-76 (discussing "suspect" characteristics
that might signal need for judicial intervention).
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Some reject even that retreat from majority rule. They insist that
the terms of whatever constitutional protection is to be afforded the
losers in a majority-rule system be determined solely by reference to
choices and votes cast hundreds of years ago in the text of the Bill of
Rights. This originalist orientation exacerbates the tension with democratic principle. In what sense are the people governing themselves if
the controversial policies of the day are being determined by fractions
of the population, whose only constraints are prescribed by fractions
of earlier populations, now long dead?8 Many have tried their hands
at defending or refining such a system in the name of democracy, but
all have failed.9
But Eisgruber says that "[d] emocracy is not the same thing as majoritarianism."' 0 Indeed, majority rule-even without the aggravated
problems added by superimposing an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution-is downright undemocratic. It is undemocratic because
it responds only to the interests of some of the people, not all. Those
who are left out are not really governing themselves. This proposition
seems defensible even beyond the arguments that Eisgruber offers to
support it. There is some support for this idea in scholarship that has
pointed out that the Constitution simply cannot be squared with a
commitment to majority rule. 1 In addition, Madison's Federalist 1012
makes very clear that decision by electoral majorities is not necessarily
the path to good government, nor is it the path that our Constitution,
with its republican scheme of representation, establishes.
One who wishes to construct a more democratic way to resolve
important societal disputes must confront an additional challenge,
however. That challenge lies in identifying, supporting, defining, and
implementing some sort of obligation in government to those who are
not part of the majority (using the term "majority" here loosely to
8. See EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 26-28 (discussing anti-democratic nature of the
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation). This is reminiscent of the "inter-temporal difficulty" coined by Ackerman. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1045-47 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980).

10.

EISGRUBER,

supra note 2, at 18.

11. See Lawrence Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (1990)
(demonstrating the Constitution's poor fit with a notion of popular sovereignty, if that
latter notion is understood to mean majority rule); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty
and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 531, 552-55 (1998) (pointing out many ways in
which m jority rule cannot be said to square with constitutional aspirations).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(pointing out dangers of faction, even when it constitutes a majority, if moved by interests
adverse to the interests of all).
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mean those whose votes have together produced the government and
who generally support its policies). Where would such an obligation
come from, and what would it oblige the government to do or refrain
from doing? Perhaps more fundamentally, what is the "government"
apart from the majority of the people such that it could shoulder obligations at all? This is the basic problem of self-government that Eisgruber sets out to resolve.
II.

The Solution

It is the problem of understanding how government can stand
apart from, yet take into account the interests of, all its citizens that
leads Eisgruber to the principle of "impartiality," which forms a foundational building block for his argument. As he defines this term, it
refers to an obligation on government to be responsive to the interests
3
and needs of all the people.'
A.

Derivation of a Principle of Impartiality

It is striking that Eisgruber does not point to the Constitution, or
any part of it, to defend the existence of this principle of impartiality.
I believe it could be defended as arising out of the Constitution's fundamental commitment to the equality (moral and political) of all persons. This thick conception of equality finds support in the text and in
the structure, as well as in political theory and in the history of the
4
Constitution.'
But Eisgruber would view that as backwards. Instead of beginning
with the Constitution and seeking to understand what it tells us to do
to accomplish its goals, Eisgruber begins his analysis with what he
views as a prior national commitment: the commitment to democracy
or, a concept that he uses interchangeably, popular sovereignty.1 5 Democracy, properly understood, is a way of describing the prior state of
the people before they constituted a nation through the adoption of a
written constitution. Its core meaning is the entitlement of the people
13. See EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 19.
14.' See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rv. (forthcoming
Dec. 2002) (making a related argument about the equality commitments of the Constitution giving rise to an entitlement in all persons for representation of a certain type in the
political branches of government).
15. The work of Bruce Ackerman could be viewed as taking a somewhat similar posture toward the inter-relationship between the principle of popular sovereignty, embodied
in the words "we the people," and the Constitution itself. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, WE THE
PEOPLE I: FOUNDATIONS 7 (1991) (suggesting there are overriding popular commitments
that take priority over the strict terms of the Constitution itself).
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to govern themselves, and one of the steps that the American people
took in fulfillment of that entitlement was the act of adopting a constitution. Thus the document should be understood as a byproduct,
rather than a progenitor, of self-government.
Understood this way, it is democracy that ultimately gives rise to
constitutionalism, not the other way around. For Eisgruber, democracy, suitably understood, comes first, and this orientation ultimately
will have consequences for the process of interpreting the Constitution. For example, the "open-textured" provisions that have provided
such fodder for constitutional theorists of all stripes must, on this account, be read in such a way as to further the cause of self-government. This view, placing democracy conceptually prior to the
Constitution, obviously resounds principally in theory, not history,
and so I would not expect a historical foundation for this ambitious
claim. But the book would have benefited, in my view, from a more
thorough discussion of the derivation of this understanding of the
American polity. I do not gather that Eisgruber would seek to ground
his claim in either history or moral philosophy, but rather in a kind of
practical view of who "we the people" should be understood to be.
Because the primordial status of popular sovereignty is a rich idea that
does a great deal of work in the argument to come, I would welcome
elaboration.
B.

Application of the Impartiality Principle

Eisgruber's syllogism proceeds as follows: Americans are committed to democracy and self-government. Democracy and self-government are not served by any structure that systematically privileges
majorities, because such a privilege does not allow all the people a
voice in governing themselves. Put a bit more forcefully, majority rule
is undemocratic. Therefore, American government requires that mar
jority rule be limited.
Enter constitutionalism. Eisgruber posits constitutionalism in
general as a means to limit majority government in the service of democracy, and our Constitution in particular is best understood to
serve that function.' 6 Its super-majoritarian amendment procedures,
for example, are consistent with a constitutional design to develop
pragmatic devices for implementing democracy by limiting the power
of majoritarian government. For this and other reasons, our Constitu16.

See Eisgruber, supra note 2, at 20.
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tion should be interpreted as a document committed to serving the
cause of democracy.
Democracy requires impartiality. This notion of impartiality
obliges a government to maintain some effective mechanism for responding to the interests of all persons.1 7 Impartiality, Eisgruber argues, more faithfully serves democracy than does simple
majoritarianism, because it more fully responds to the beliefs and values that the American people hold and more effectively achieves
justice.

18

Therefore, the Constitution requires impartiality. Because it is
dedicated to the establishment and support of self-government, the
Constitution must be understood to contain a promise that the government will adhere to the principle of impartiality, dictated ultimately by democracy itself. Impartiality, then, is the key to
understanding how the Constitution enables the American people to
govern themselves in a truly democratic spirit, avoiding the pitfalls of
the simple majoritarian model.
C.

Situating Responsibility for Impartiality

So far, we have said that on Eisgruber's account, the Constitution
ought to be read to impose on the government an obligation to alleviate the undemocratic implications of pure majority rule-a means of
taking into account the interests and views of all persons. The next
question is where this obligation will be placed in order to permit the
government to carry out the mission embodied in the impartiality
principle. The structural provisions of the Constitution, with their numerous instances of tempering, buffering, and balancing of majority
government, clearly contribute to this goali 9 But in addition to these
largely procedural checks, there must be a way for government to resolve controversial moral issues such that this important aspect of public policymaking does not fall victim to pure majority rule. 20 The
question is what part of government should be delegated this task.
17. See id. at 19, 54.
18.' See id.
19. 1 am speaking, for example, of the separation of legislative power into two
branches with differently constituted electorates, as well as the checks and balances between President and Congress.
20. Eisgruber asserts that the people themselves make a distinction between matters
that involve pure preference or collective self-interest and those that implicate principle. It
is not clear whether this is an empirical claim or some other type of claim. To be true to
the people's own approach to moral issues, Eisgruber argues that a government also must
identify and segregate out issues of principle to be handled differently in the decision-
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Eisgruber approaches the question gently, asking not whether the
judiciary would be the perfect, the best, or the only institution capable
of implementing this aspect of government's obligation to the people, 2' but rather whether the judiciary is at least as good as any other
actor in our government.2 2 I take it that the question is asked this way
to reflect the fact that we do have an Article III in place, with a history
23
of judicial review of constitutional claims.
Eisgruber suggests that certain institutional characteristics of
courts make them an appropriate repository for the obligation to
make sure that public policymaking comports with the values of the
people as a whole. Among these are the constitutional procedures for
nomination and confirmation of judges by the elected branches of
government, combined with their insulation from electoral pressures
once in office. Together these structural components ensure some
sort of fidelity to mainstream American values at the front end and
give the judges the freedom to administer those values impartially
from then on. This combination of political influence and independence is unavailable in any other branch of our government.
Understanding the nature of impartiality is critical to any effort to
evaluate whether Eisgruber is correct in concluding that the judiciary
is institutionally suited to implement the principle. The usual understanding of "impartiality" might suggest, unhelpfully, something like
the familiar judicial obligation to avoid conflict of interest and bias, or
decision-making influenced illegitimately by self-interest, rather than
law or policy. If one interpreted the concept of government impartiality this way, there would be little to distinguish courts from other potential decision-makers in the competition for a claim to impartiality;
this type of impartiality is simply a standard ingredient of good government. Indeed, as a society we fully expect and require all our decision-makers (except voters) to avoid conflicts of interest, bias, and selfinterest in their public acts. Professor Hills's account, I believe, has
succumbed to the temptation to understand impartiality according to
making process. It is only the matters imbued with moral implications that require the
salutary effect of impartiality rather than majority rule. A fuller account of the basis for the
special judicial handling of moral questions would be very helpful here.
21. Indeed, he explicitly acknowledges that one could imagine a government that
satisfies the demands of impartiality without judicial review as we know it.

22.

See

EISGRUBER,

supra note 2, at 52-53.

23. To its credit, this book does not have the air of a thought experiment devoted
solely to the ethereal issues surrounding the design of an ideal democratic society. Rather
it is grounded very much in the society that we have and the government that we already
know.
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this ordinary usage rather than indulging the author his own definition of the term. As a result, his attacks on Eisgruber's arguments for
the judiciary's having a superior likelihood of impartiality compare
the respective government actors according to the likely purity of
their motives in the casting of votes. 24 This attack, however, is not responsive to the complex idea that Eisgruber defends in his book. As I
read Eisgruber's argument, impartiality is not just a prerequisite to
good or fair decision-making, as it would be in the popular sense of the
term. Rather, his form of impartiality is essential to democratic decisionmaking. But what does impartiality require a government to do and
are courts well-suited for the task?
Eisgruber looks to impartiality to undergird a deep and broad
obligation on the part of a democratic government to serve in a representative capacity on behalf of all the people. This includes an ability
to speak even for a people that may be divided on issues of moral
principle. And it even includes an obligation, I gather, to represent
the people against themselves when issues of immediate popular interest deflect attention from the people's deeper commitments to more
enduring beliefs such as justice.
Eisgruber's insistence on representation means that all of these
aspects of a complex people must find a voice somewhere in the government structure. Some parts of government respond well to the obligation to represent the people on issues regarding preferences and
collective self-interest. Local government serves this function in some
respects, as does the elected legislature at state and national levels. 25
But a truly representative government, argues Eisgruber, must also
recognize that these are not the only matters on which the American
people need a voice. They also have commitments to moral principle
which must be represented somewhere in government.2 6 Democracy
requires no less.
The question remains which branch of government is best suited
to serve as the people's representative in the resolution of issues involving moral principle. Eisgruber emphasizes that the courts have
some institutional advantages over other contenders. Among these advantages, in addition to the security that comes from some degree of
political independence, is the obligation to provide written reasons to
support the moral judgments that they are asked to make on behalf of
the people that they represent. This aspect ofjudicial decision-making
24.
25.

26.

See Hills, supra note 5, at 40-42.
See EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 92-93.
See id. at 53.
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responds particularly well to the people's own expectation that moral
choices will be supported by moral reasons, and not resolved simply
by reasons of political influence or sheer numbers. The judiciary's aptitude for the task of addressing issues of principle is reminiscent, in
some respects, of the "sober second thought" idea that appears in
Bickel's account of judicial review. 27 Like Eisgruber, Bickel saw in the
institutional characteristics of courts an opportunity to stand back and
take stock of the larger issues that may be implicated by particular
government actions, especially when they affect individuals. It is Eisgruber who makes the sober second thought a prerequisite to selfgovernment.
There will no doubt be critics who will bristle at any suggestion
that a court may be better at resolving issues of principle than either
voters themselves or their elected representatives. They will rush to
cite literature on actual voter behavior showing how seriously the people take the job of public policymaking, and to offer examples in
which the public took issues of principle seriously, and then insist that
they have destroyed Eisgruber's case for judicial review. But there is
fallacy in this response.
I do not understand Eisgruber to be suggesting in any sense that
the people or their elected representatives are unprincipled. Quite
the opposite, his case for judicial review rests in part on a claim that
the people hold a commitment to maintaining a national fidelity to
certain moral principles, and that that commitment needs expression
in government. Eisgruber does not suggest that the courts are the only
institution that could be selected to carry out this representative function. Rather, he seeks to show that there is no need to fear that, by
allocating this aspect of impartial rule to the judiciary, we have sacrificed any of the vigor of democratic self-government.
Again, a comparison to Bickel comes to mind. Bickel resolved
what he called "the Lincolnian tension" between expediency and principle by placing responsibility for the latter with the courts, precisely
because of the same institutional characteristics to which Eisgruber
also points. 28 The difference between Eisgruber and Bickel is in how
they proceed from the common recognition of the institutionalcharacteristics supporting that division of labor. Bickel-who thought
courts strained in tension with self-government-would have courts
do as little as possible in the realm of principle, while Eisgruber-who
27. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 26. The term was coined by Justice Stone. See Harlan
Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
28.

See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 65.
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sees this tension as overstated-would rely on them to give voice to
the people's belief injustice in a more fulsome version of government
by and for themselves.
D.

Guiding the Judiciary in Implementing the Impartiality
Principle

Assigning the judiciary the task of overseeing society's commitment to principle is not new, and should not be especially controversial. Eisgruber's instructions to the judiciary on how to carry out this
task, however, are not so familiar. His novel approach asks courts to
look, not to their own personal belief systems or to those of the founders or the great political and moral philosophers, but to those of the
American people. Emphasizing consistently the democratic pedigree
of the courts and their representative status, Eisgruber asks them to
undertake to resolve constitutional questions based on what they determine to be the way that the people (heterogeneous though we may
be) view justice. The objective then becomes the ambitious project of
29
constructing the American people's conception of justice.
This democratization of principle could, perhaps, be faulted for
giving too much to the people. It would be a sad irony if Eisgruber's
arduous effort to avoid the vices of majoritarianism ended up with a
standard that rested on what most people think justice requires. But I
believe that Eisgruber fends off that criticism quite well by emphasizing that ultimately it will be the judge's task to make the determination according to a wide variety of factors, some determined by
consensus or other indicia of popular sentiment, and others influenced by more tempered indications of national values over time,
such as history and tradition-all of which pass through the filter of
judgment.
Eisgruber's theory has more than this. He embellishes this basic
account by suggesting there are certain types of moral questions ("discrete" and "comprehensive") that courts are institutionally better
suited and less well suited to resolve, respectively. But essentially, I
have described the guidance that courts are given in the book as to
how to implement the important task that Eisgruber gives to them. I
will devote the remainder of this essay to exploring in more detail
what kinds of moral questions the courts should answer and posing
for Professor Eisgruber some questions caused by an ambiguity in the
understanding of the notion of moral judgment itself.
29.

See EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 126.
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The Two Faces of Moral Judgment

The heart of Eisgruber's claim is the proposition that the Supreme Court should speak on behalf of the American people on matters of moral principle. I would put it somewhat differently: The
Supreme Court should speak on behalf of the American people on
matters that implicate the relationship of government to the individual in a free society. While this latter question may itself be literally
characterized as a "moral" question in the broad sense of the word,
this use of the concept of morality invites conflation of two very different types of questions that the American people, through some institutional vehicle, must answer. In contrast to Eisgruber's focus on
"moral questions," in my view, the courts may be more profitably considered to be engaged in political judgment.
The importance of the distinction between Eisgruber's "moral
question" and my "political judgment" can be illustrated by considering an example from one of the moral controversies of the day in our
society. Suppose a community wishes to criminalize same-sex activity,
for example, because a majority of the people in that community believe, according to their own moral schema, that such sexual behavior
is immoral. Responding to that majority sentiment from its constituents, the local legislature outlaws the behavior. Is the legislature acting
morally? Immorally? Who would answer such a question? One could
say that the legislature is acting according to its highest moral principle, the faithful representation of its constituents' passionately held
views. Or one could say that the legislature is acting immorally by restricting such an important aspect of an individual's opportunity to
shape a meaningful life. Or one could say that morality is simply elusive at this level of decision-making. In order to be considered coherently, the act of the legislature must be broken down into two
component acts, one of which is explicit and the other of which is
implicit.
The explicit act is that the legislature has, in its representative
capacity, accurately expressed the community's view that certain behavior is not morally supportable. I will call this the First-Order Question-in my example, whether the commission of sexual acts by
members of the same sex is immoral. That question quite clearly
presents itself as a moral issue. In the hypothetical, the moral issue was
resolved by the legislature on moral grounds through law. One could
hardly blame the legislators under these circumstances, if they went
on the local television news after the vote and sought to take credit for
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standing up for the moral views of the community by passing this law.
That is exactly what they have done in the example.
But this hypothetical law simultaneously constitutes a second public act. This local criminal law also carries with it the unstated expression that "it is appropriate for this community to restrict the sexual
activity that it finds morally offensive through criminal sanction." I call
this the Second-Order Question-whether the community is correct
to conclude, even implicitly, that it may create and enforce a law of
this kind consistent with the principles of American democracy. Although one could consider this a moral question as well (as I gather
Eisgruber would do), it implicates an entirely different set of moral
criteria from those involved in the First-Order Question. For this reason, it might profitably be given a distinctive name, such as a political
judgment. Moreover, institutional aptitude to resolve one type of
moral question may not necessarily correlate to the same aptitude to
resolve another.
When a person aggrieved by such a law challenges it in the federal courts according to constitutional practice, the "moral" issue that
gave rise to the law (the First-Order Question) almost literally disappears and in its place arises a very different issue. The issue is not
whether the particular sexual activity at issue is, in fact, moral or immoral, and thus whether the legislating community is right or wrong
on its moral judgment-according to personal values, national consensus, or any other measure. It is difficult for me to imagine a tribunal to which I would entrust that role. I am concerned that
Eisgruber's book could be read to say that he envisions the courts as
that tribunal.
But I am sure that Eisgruber would agree that the altogether new
issue presented by the hypothetical case is whether the Constitution
permits a legislature to restrict the private sexual activity of consenting
adults in this particular manner. That-a form of the Second-Order
Question-is the question, and the only question, that the Supreme
Court is actually called upon to answer. Eisgruber clearly thinks of this
as a "moral" question as well. But I would hope it could it be meaningfully distinguished. The conflation of the First- and Second-Order
Questions detracts dangerously from the argument for acceptance of
judicial decision-making as a part of the democratic process.
If the Court were to be set up as an arbiter of moral correctness
for all the people, it would invite the kind of response that Professor
Hills provided, in which he argues that the people (the voters or the
legislatures) are better able to answer their own moral questions than
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is the Court. If the question is of the First-Order variety, then I would
agree with Professor Hills and Justice Scalia in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,30 that "nine people picked at random from
the Kansas City telephone directory" could decide as well as the Court
31
the question of whether some human behavior is or is not moral.
This is because the institutional characteristics that Eisgruber emphasizes as the foundation for the democratic pedigree and fitness of the
Court to resolve moral issues do not render them fit to resolve the
First-Order Questions such as whether same-sex sodomy is moral behavior or not. That is exactly the question we do not want the Court to
decide, it seems to me.
For example, Eisgruber emphasizes the political aspects of the
nomination and confirmation process that have demonstrably affected the composition and perspective of the courts. This connection
to accountable government is offered as a reason for us to trust the
judiciary to be tethered somewhat to mainstream values and to be
competent to do the job of interpreting the Constitution according to
what it determines to be the principles of the American people. If the
courts are asking only First-Order moral questions, however, just as
the community and its legislature ask those questions, then the political influence on judges becomes disabling rather than salutary. Judges
whose personal moral views on social issues are consistent with the
mainstream of American society cannot provide the independent,
longer view that Eisgruber's impartiality theory demands. We would
have no reason to trust that the judges supply any sort of independent
force to ensure impartiality and temper majority rule that Eisgruber
rightly insists upon in a democracy. 32 Thus we would have the worst of
all worlds-majoritarian values that are imposed judicially rather than
legislatively.
The Supreme Court came dangerously close to this approach in
Bowers v. Hardwick.33 In that case, the Court contributed to a conflation of First- and Second-Order moral questions by suggesting that a
"moral" basis for legislation is sufficient to supply the minimum rationality required of laws in our democracy. Moreover, the Court
came as close as possible to placing the courts at the top of a moral
pyramid, when Justice White, writing for the majority, articulated soci30.
31.
32.
ing that
33.

497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990).
Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Girardeau A. Spann, PurePolitics,88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1990-94 (1990) (arguthe Supreme Court is not counter-majoritarian enough).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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ety's historical practice of denouncing homosexual activity and concluded that was sufficient, in effect, to end the Court's inquiry. If he
had taken the small final step of saying, "and we agree with Georgia
that this prohibited conduct is immoral," then the case would have
provided the perfect example of a court exercising the wrong kind of
moral supervision over the law.
But Eisgruber has also contributed to the confusion on this issue.
His treatment of the Hardwick case illustrates the linguistic ambiguity
in the use of the term "moral" as applied to these questions. That case,
in which the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of a
"moral" basis for the community's prohibition, is the case that Eisgruber singles out as an example of one in which the Court was insufficiently attentive to moral issues. He suggests that had Justice White
"put his opinion on moral grounds, he would at least have given the
public an accurate account of the Court's responsibilities and its approach to them. '34 Eisgruber means, I think, thatJustice White should
have explicitly discussed the politicaljudgment that the Court was implicitly making regarding the appropriateness of a legislature's imposition of this kind of restriction on individual freedom-the SecondOrder Question that tacitly underlay the Court's opinion. To call that
judgment "moral" at the same time that the Court is defending the
' '35
state's enactment of "laws representing essentially moral choices
presents a dizzying cacophony.
Another source of the confusion is Eisgruber's recognition that
"[m]any theorists suppose that if people in a democracy divide over
questions of value, then the majority's view ought to prevail." 36 The

theorists he describes, as I have understood them, have suggested that
when part of a community thinks, for example, that homosexuality or
abortion is immoral, while another part does not share that moral
view, the right result is that those with the most votes should be able to
make a determination for all. The Supreme Court has itself taken this
view when it pointed out that, by declining to recognize constitutional
limits on states' resolutions of divisive moral disagreements, it "per37
mits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."
Thus, courts that take this view adopt a very passive role or even give
34. EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 120.
35. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
36. EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 53 (citing ELY, supra note 3, at 179, for the proposition
that "the choosing of values is a prerogative appropriately left to the majority").
37. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). See also Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 956 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[t]his Court should return this matter
[abortion] to the people").
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total deference to the acts of the popularly elected branches of government on certain issues.3 8 By doing so, they ensure that these types
of divisive moral questions are resolved legislatively, notjudicially. Eisgruber's discussion suggests, however, that he might call upon the
Court to resolve the moral dispute dividing the people. He says, for
example, that "[1]ife tenure enhances the possibility that judges will
approach moral issues in a disinterested fashion, and so bring to bear
upon those issues the right kinds of reasons-reasons that flow from a
genuine effort to distinguish between right and wrong, rather than
from self-interest. ' '3 9 This could be understood to suggest that Eisgruber would have the Court answer the same question that had divided the people-the First-Order Question regarding the morality of
some behavior-based on which side it thinks got the right answer.
These are not the questions the courts should be answering.
. The question we do want the Court to decide, in every such case,
is the question of what limits there should be on a government wishing (for moral or other reasons) to restrict the freedom of an individual in a democratic state such as ours-the permissible extent of such
restrictions and the reasons governments can offer to support them.
This judgment requires the very qualities that Eisgruber celebrates in
the judiciary-a familiarity with American history, a sense of the
American people and the kind of society we view ourselves as having,
with freedom to make the decision according to what is right, in the
absence of any fear of particular recrimination or retaliation.
If the issue before the courts were framed this way, I believe the
skeptics would have more difficulty claiming that the average person
or legislator is in a better position to answer the question thoughtfully
than is the Court. Professor Hills reminds, us, for example, that the
people tend to feel more passionate about their moral convictions
than does the Court. 40 He offers this as a reason to suggest that people
are better than judges at deciding moral questions. He is right, I
think, to point out that passion is important to principle, and that the
passionate pursuit of principle by citizens is one of democracy's
proudest traditions. But this passion should be devoted to the FirstOrder moral convictions-like whether slavery or racial segregation is
a morally acceptable state of affairs. Passion can actually be an impediment, however, to resolution of the Second-Order Question38. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
COURT 24-29 (1999).
39. EISGRUBER, supra note 2, at 78.
40. See Hills, supra note 5, at 16-18.
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whether the appropriate relationship of government to the individual
in a free society can tolerate a practice that the people may feel passionately about in the moral sense. That is a question best resolved
dispassionately, by courts using their best political judgment about societal expectations of liberty.41 Once the two questions are carefully
separated, it is quite clear that the very fact that the people are passionate and committed to their moral beliefs (and thereby in harmony with the demands placed upon them by a First-Order Question)
impedes them from being good at the Second-Order Question. The
impartiality principle that Professor Eisgruber establishes in the first
half of his book demands that these Second-Order Questions be answered based on accessible reasons, not on passion.
Is it morally acceptable to terminate a pregnancy? Is it morally
acceptable for a physician to assist a terminally ill person to take her
own life? These are moral questions of the most passionate variety.
But democracy requires that a further question be answered in every
case: Whatever the truth about the morality of abortion, whatever the
truth about the morality of assisted suicide, to what extent can the
moral views of one fraction of the population be permitted to control
the behavior of the rest, given the depth and importance of each of
these matters to living a meaningful life in a free society? That question is not one on which passion should rule the day. Rather, that is a
question for someone who does tend to have a longer view, deriving,
perhaps from a greater sense of history and tradition, and a passing
acquaintance with political philosophy involving the relationship between an individual and a state-and, as Eisgruber argues, a representative obligation to the American people. This is a Second-Order
inquiry that requires the luxury of independence.
Does this mean that judges, afforded these privileges, will always
do a good job at making the political judgments that we ask of them?
Will they always be free of bias and passion and self-interest? Of course
not. Courts throughout history, including the present, have placed
strains upon many a commitment to a vigorous judiciary. But, like the
framers, we need to separate the institutional questions from the personal. Just as an incompetent President does not condemn Article II, a
judiciary that is not good at being the guardian of principle does not
negate the institutional advantages that that body is given in order to
41. See John Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1419, 1459-61 (1999)
(describing justice Cardozo's view that the detached judge will be more inclined to see law
as a system of concepts, rules and principles, and to take seriously the idea that a large part
of his job is to understand and render that system coherent).
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encourage it in its task. Nor should it weaken our commitment to confiding this important task to the courts.
Eisgruber has given us the reasons to entrust to the judiciary the
ultimate question of political judgment I have called the Second-Order Question: What kind of relationship between a government and
an individual can be tolerated in a free democracy? 4 2 At least with
regard to individual rights provisions in the Constitution, and even,
with slight variation, with regard to other constitutional provisions,
this is the question the Supreme Court has to answer most frequently.
It must answer that same question again and again in different forms
as it addresses each of the many invocations of constitutional protection that the litigants before it intone. It is appropriate that there
should be one specialized body particularly suited to answering that
question so important to a democracy.
If the right question is posed, however-the Second-Order Question-then the judicial selection process can be used effectively. What
the political process of appointment can produce is judges who, while
perhaps holding mainstream views on moral issues personally, yet, by
reason of judgment, experience, and institutional independence, are
able to set aside those personal views long enough to address honestly
the only question appropriate for their resolution-whether the Constitution tolerates the state action at issue. There is no reason to think
that the person on the street, or nine people picked at random from
the Kansas City telephone directory, would be more competent to answer that question of political judgment than a person selected for
appointment through the constitutional confirmation process.
Professor Eisgruber has contributed to the consideration of the
judiciary's proper task both descriptively and prescriptively. He demonstrates that the assignment of the Second-Order Question to the
judiciary need not be something a democracy is ashamed of, but
rather is an integral part of a vigorous commitment to democracy. In
addition, he instructs the courts in how to do their assigned task42. There will be times when the distinction between First- and Second-Order Questions collapses somewhat, most often when the question involves government, rather than
private, behavior. For example, the morality of imposing the death penalty may appear to
present both levels of question. Yet the courts must always ask the question cast in terms of
the assessment of the use of power by the state upon the individual, and the people's views
on that political question will be relevant, on Eisgruber's account, to the court's resolution
of the matter. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2249 n.21 (June 20, 2002) (using
polling data to support majority's conclusion that execution of mentally retarded is contrary to consensus view held by American people). See also id. at 2255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ridiculing majority's use of polling evidence as "judicial fiat").
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how to answer their single question-with as great a sensitivity as possible to the society they are designated to represent. This makes explicit that the basis for their judgment should be in the tradition
established by Justice Cardozo and then carried on by Justice Harlan.
Cardozo advocated a "sensitive inquiry, at once historical and normative, into 'the traditions and conscience of our people."' 43 Justice
Harlan later captured a similar spirit when he interpreted the constitutional inquiry as "the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society. '4 4 Eisgruber elaborates by making this inquiry even more explicitly an investigation into
the conceptions of justice that the American people hold.
The ambiguity that I have identified in the judges' undertaking
suggests to me that Eisgruber's aversion to conceptualism and overly
technical lawyerly readings of the Constitution may have led him to
leave us with an underdeveloped solution to the problem of interpretation. It would be very helpful to hear from Professor Eisgruber more
on what he means for the judge to do when approaching moral questions, and the ways in which judges should use their special competence to address such questions. But he may believe that any more
specificity is impossible or undesirable-that the best that a sound
constitutional theory can do is to free judges from the artificial and
destructive constraints imposed by other theories, to go out and use
their judgment as best they can. This view of the judge's role would fit
into the tradition of practical judgment espoused by Justices Cardozo
and Harlan, and would give new importance to the process of selecting judges.
My favorite aspect of this book is that it gives us a newjob description to use when we go out looking for people to nominate to the
bench. It is high time. At least since Nixon's presidency, the public
rhetoric surrounding appointments to the bench has revolved around
a variety of terms, phrases, and jargon all designed to suggest that
judges have no real place in our democracy: "if we must have them, at
least let's not give them anything important to do." Judges have been
portrayed as an embarrassment.
Anyone who did want to give the judiciary anything important to
do was accused of being undemocratic, elite, downright un-American.
It is not surprising, therefore, that those who have been selected for
43. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 1472 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
44. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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those posts tended to be those who were best at not claiming to be
good at anything. The moment a person could be said to be good at
something, there would be fear that she might actually seek to use her
talents to do something. And that is undemocratic. So if we have attracted any degree of quality of insight, heart, judgment, or intellect
to the bench through this abysmal process, it is pretty much a matter
of luck.
Professor Hills points out plausibly that "the confirmation process
has become an intellectually barren game of cat-and-mouse, where
the nominee blandly refuses to say anything that could spark the sort
of popular discussion that Eisgruber celebrates and the hostile Senators try to trap the nominee into saying something substantial and
therefore controversial." 45 But that barren wasteland is due, I think, to
the very mantra that Hills intones. The debate is barren because the
public does not want a Court that makes important political judgments. How would a president justify to the people a rigorous search
for the keenest intellect or most impressive judgment to nominate for
the bench if the judge, once appointed, is supposed to defer at every
turn to the majoritarian processes of government? What would be the
point of pressing a candidate with challenging discussions focused on
his or her political insight or quality of legal analysis? Somehow it has
become publicly acceptable, if not required, to embrace the skeptic's
view that judges should only follow the law and not seek to make it.
But if we take Eisgruber's ideas seriously, the polity could begin
to have a very different discussion about its judiciary. It would enable
us publicly to admit that the Court has an important job, admit that
the Court does have a significant role to play in the making of law,
when it asks the final question of a law: whether the law is consistent
with a tolerable relationship between a government and an individual
in a free society. The question we would want to ask a potential judge
is how deeply he or she understands the American people's notion of
liberty as it prepares to confront new forms of antagonism in changing times. Would we feel comfortable entrusting the most significant
political-as opposed to moral-judgments in those hands? Stealth
candidates need not apply.
Conclusion
In the end, the real disagreement in constitutional theory divides
over whether we have a Constitution to prevent societal change or to
45.

Hills, supra note 5, at 53.
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facilitate it. Eisgruber reminds us that the idea of preventing change
compromises our very commitment to democracy. On the affirmative
side, he also inspires us to believe that it is possible to facilitate change
46
without the loss of moral principle-we can mature without rotting.
And the courts have an important role to play in that democratic
evolution.
Participation in government is an important part of self-rule. So is
electoral control. But together, those two aspects of democracy, government of and by the people, make an incomplete picture of our
nation's commitment to popular sovereignty. To achieve the threesided geometrical figure with the greatest strength and stability, we
also need the final element, a sense that all people are protected by
the enduring principles that ensure liberty.
For Eisgruber, constitutionalism is a way of opening up the possibilities of a polity to flourish and to seek its most noble ends. It is an
enabling, an empowering device for the people, through their governments, to live out their deepest commitments and to give meaning to
their sincere conceptions of justice. This affirmative portrayal of a
constitution stands in stark contrast to those offered by the vast majority of theorists, who tend to view constitutionalism as a way to shut
down, constrain or disable the people. That view inspires theories that
artificially formalize and cramp the interpretation of the Constitution,
seeking, overall, to rob judges of their most valuable asset, their judgment. But Eisgruber shows us that, understood for what it is, the Constitution can do wonderful things by presenting to the people an
account of their own moral judgments, thus enabling them to maintain a government for the people.

46. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
40-41 (1997) (expressing the view that the adoption of a bill of rights suggests founders'
skepticism "that societies always 'mature,' as opposed to rot"), quoted in EiSGRUBER, supra
note 2, at 36.

